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Abstract 
With its increasing integration into the world economy, agricultural exports and 
rural incomes in Vietnam have increased substantially in recent years. At the sub–
national level, however, there are concerns that not all regions and categories of 
agricultural producers have and will benefit from the ongoing liberalization of 
agricultural markets.  
Vietnam’s elongated geography and lack of spatial market integration pose special 
problems in this regard. Accordingly, this study aims to answer three interrelated 
questions: (a) whether there is spatial integration between paddy markets in the 
North and South of Vietnam; (b) whether there is spatial integration in paddy 
markets within the North and within the South; and, (c) if within-region 
integration is stronger and faster than between-region integration. 
The empirical model we develop to answer these questions, uses estimates of 
transfer costs to generalize the well known model of spatial market integration 
due to Ravallion to allow for the possibility of threshold effects. A sequential 
testing strategy is developed which progressively tests for market segmentation, 
the number of thresholds, long-run market integration, common 
dynamics/informational efficiency, and (a strict version of) the ‘Law’ of One 
Price within an error-correction framework. 
When the unrestricted version of this model is estimated using monthly paddy prices 
for eight markets between 1993 and 2006, we find weak evidence of market 
integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam with an absence 
of threshold effects. However, there is evidence of both threshold effects and stronger 
forms of spatial market integration for paddy markets within the North and within the 
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*** Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen South, with at least 60% percent of price changes being transmitted between markets 
within one month whenever price spreads exceeds their upper or lower thresholds. The 
extent and speed of price transmission within regional paddy markets is generally 
faster in the South than the North of Vietnam. However, the instantaneous version of 
the ‘Law’ of One Price, which requires full price adjustment to occur within a month, 
only holds for a few regimes and market pairs. 
Three main policy implications flow from these results. First, since there is limited 
evidence of integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam, 
national level policies cannot be relied upon to stabilize or support paddy prices. 
Second, since there is evidence of spatial market integration within the Red River and 
Mekong River deltas, paddy markets within these regions can be relied upon to 
transmit price signals between deficit and surplus areas relatively well. Third, since 
the speed and extent of price transmission is relatively rapid within the North and 
within the South of Vietnam, the private sector trade can be relied upon to transfer 
rice and paddy between markets in an efficient manner. Problems might, however, 
emerge if large demand-supply imbalances were to emerge between the North and 
South, as transfer costs would prevent private sector trade taking place. In these 
circumstances, the public sector might need to intervene, in a consistent and market 
friendly way, to ensure adequate food supplies in the short-term. 
Keywords: market integration, paddy market, error-correction, spatial integration 1  Introduction 
With its increasing integration into the world economy, Vietnam’s agricultural 
exports have grown substantially in recent years. From being a net importer of 
rice in the late 1980s, by the late 1990s Vietnam had become one of the largest 
rice exporting countries. Paddy production has grown from about 23 million 
metric tons in 1993 to around 36 million metric tons in 2005, with 70 percent of 
total paddy output coming from the Red River and Mekong River deltas. 
At the sub–national level, there are concerns that not all regions and categories 
of agricultural producers have and will benefit from the liberalization of 
Vietnam’s agricultural markets. There are two distinct aspects to these 
concerns. First, if domestic markets are not spatially integrated, not all regions 
will benefit from market and trade liberalization to the same extent. The 
elongated geography of Vietnam poses special problems in this regard. 
Second, even if domestic markets are integrated in the long term, lack of 
integration in the short-term may mean that price changes are not transmitted 
between consumption centres and production areas quickly enough. If this is 
the case, agricultural market liberalization may disproportionately benefit 
traders and agricultural processors rather than agricultural producers and 
consumers. 
Accordingly, this study aims to answer three interrelated questions. The first 
question is whether there is spatial integration between paddy markets in the 
North and South of Vietnam. The elongated geography of Vietnam results in high 
transfer costs for food market transactions between the northern and the southern 
regions. This makes it interesting to look into the degree of integration in the 
paddy markets, as trade is in all likelihood not the determining factor for market 
integration between the North and the South of Vietnam. 
 The second question we seek to answer is whether there is spatial integration 
in paddy markets within the North and within the South, specifically in the 
Red River and Mekong River deltas. We focus on paddy prices in the Red 
River and Mekong deltas for this analysis, both because they produce over 
two-thirds of national paddy output and because the price data for these 
regions is fairly comprehensive and complete. 
Finally, a natural third question to ask is if within-region integration is stronger 
and faster than between-region integration. 
Our analysis, which uses threshold error correction models to sequentially 
test for different forms of market integration using monthly paddy prices for 
  3eight provinces in Vietnam, indicates a weak integration of the paddy 
markets between the North and the South of Vietnam. However, within the 
northern and southern regions, there is evidence of stronger market 
integration, with 50 to 85 percent of price changes being transmitted between 
markets within one month whenever inter-market price spreads are large 
enough to induce profitable trade flows between provinces. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overall 
description of the paddy production in Vietnam from the beginning of the 1990s 
to 2005. Section 3 discusses the importance of thresholds when analyzing spatial 
market integration in the presence of transfer costs and describes our modeling 
and testing strategy. In Section 4 we describe the paddy price data used and how 
we have estimated transfer costs. Descriptive statistics and (linear) tests of 
stationarity and cointegration are also presented in this section. In Section 5, we 
use the paddy price series to test for various forms of market integration between 
the North and South of Vietnam as well as within these regions. Finally, Section 6 
offers some concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
2  Paddy Production, Distribution and Marketing 
Rice is the main staple in the Vietnamese diet. In the 1990s, household 
expenditure on rice was about 45 percent of total food expenditure in the rural 
areas and about 25 percent in the urban areas (Benjamin and Brandt, 2004). 
Rice policy issues ranging from measures to assist in the growing of paddy to 
the regulation of exports have considerable importance for agricultural 
researchers and policy makers. This section highlights some salient features of 
the Vietnamese paddy market. 
2.1  Natural conditions for paddy production 
About two thirds of Vietnamese farm households grow paddy to serve the high 
domestic demand for rice, exclusive of exporting requirement. Roughly 53 percent 
of Vietnam’s agricultural land area, which is approximately 4 million hectares, is 
devoted to the growing of paddy (Minot and Golleti, 1999; FAOSTAT, 2006). 
Benjamin and Brandt (2004) summarize the state of Vietnamese paddy production 
as: “Rice production in Viet Nam is characterized by small irrigated farms, multiple 
cropping, labor-intensive practices, and growing use of inorganic fertilizer, though 
there are substantial regional differences”. The planted area of paddy accounts for 
about 88 percent of the area planted of cereals in 2005 (Table 1). Although the area 
of paddy has been rising during 1993-2005, its share of total planted area of cereal 
has been declining in this period as a result of the higher growth rate of planted area 
of cereal compare with that of paddy. 
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1993 7087 5516  7058  6559  92.93 
1994 7140 5464  7136  6599  92.47 
1995 7079 5403  7324  6766  92.37 
1996 7682 5554  7621  7004  91.91 
1997 7844 5668  7768  7100  91.39 
1998 8055 5763  8016  7363  91.85 
1999 8413 6000  8349  7654  91.68 
2000 8780 6200  8399  7666  91.28 
2001 9483 6649  8225  7493  91.10 
2002 9455 6600  8323  7504  90.17 
2003 9622 6680  8367  7452  89.07 
2004 n.a  n.a  8438  7445  88.24 
2005 (prel.)  n.a  n.a  8371  7326  87.52 
Source: GS0 (2006).        
The seasons for paddy growing vary across regions. In the North, there are generally 
two paddy crops annually: the Winter-Spring crop (planted in February and harvested 
in May/June) and the Summer-Autumn crop (July to October/November). In irrigated 
areas in the South, there are usually three paddy crops per year: the Summer-Autumn 
crop (April/May to August/September), the Autumn-Winter crop (August to 
November/December) and the Winter-Spring crop (November/December-February) 
(Minot and Golleti, 1999; Luu, 2003). In rain fed areas in the South, only a wet-season 
crop is produced, which is generally planted in July/August and harvested between 
October and February. By producing three crops staggered across the year, Vietnamese 
producers can supply paddy to the market more or less continuously throughout the 
year. Nationally, the Winter-Spring crop accounts for just below one-half of paddy 
production while the Summer-Autumn and Autumn-Winter crops each account for just 
over one-quarter (Figure 1 and Table 2). 








Source: GSO (2006). 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary 
Table 2: Paddy production by season, 1995-2005 










1993 22836.5  39.57  24.67  35.77 
1994 23528.2  44.66  24.14  31.20 
1995 24963.7  43.01  26.04  30.95 
1996 26396.7  46.25  26.06  27.69 
1997 27523.9  48.36  24.12  27.52 
1998 29145.5  46.52  25.81  27.67 
1999 31393.8  44.92  27.90  27.18 
2000 32529.5  47.87  26.51  25.62 
2001 32108.4  48.19  25.94  25.87 
2002 34447.2  48.54  26.67  24.79 
2003 34568.8  48.66  27.19  24.14 
2004 36148.9  47.24  28.86  23.90 
2005 
(prel.) 35790.8  48.43 
29.10 
22.48 
Average   46.33  26.39  27.29 
Source: GSO (2006).      
  62.2  The Vietnamese paddy policy 
As the main Vietnamese staple food, rice has attracted significant attention from 
political leaders. Since the introduction of the contract system in 1980 (Directive 
100), numerous reforms have been implemented, bringing about wider and deeper 
liberalization of Vietnam’s paddy market, and a rise of around 12 million tons in 
paddy production from 1995 to 2005 (Figure 2). The main policy changes, which 
have affected the paddy market since 1980 include: 
•  The introduction of the Doi moi process in late 1986, which marked the 
beginning of a transition to a more market-oriented economy in Vietnam. 
•  The liberalization of market was gradually implemented from early 1990s, 
characterized by: 
♦  Exemption of duties on imported inputs for producing exported rice 
and the reduction of tariff on rice export from ten to one percent in 
1991.  
♦  Extension of authority to import fertilizer from central to provincial 
SOEs with foreign exchange sources of revenues also in 1991. 
However, the imposition of quotas on, and licensing import of, 
fertilizer to selected enterprises remained until 2001. 
♦  Loosening of restrictions and internal barriers to trade in rice between 
the northern and southern Vietnam was enacted in 1997 (Decree No. 
140/TTg). 
♦  A gradual lifting of the rice export quota, from under one million ton 
in 1992 to 4.5 million tons in 1998. 
♦  Abolition of quotas on rice export and fertilizer imports, together with 
support provided for the rice producers and exporters, in 2001. Since 
then the free import of fertilizer has supplemented the insufficient 
amount produced by the domestic fertilizer industry, leading to a 
decrease in fertilizer price and a rise in the supply of fertilizer. This 
liberalization of fertilizer import and rice export consequently raised 
the paddy production and export volume.  
•  Land reform Resolution 5 (1993) extended land use right, creating incentives 
in paddy cultivation. The changes included (1) extension of tenure to 20 years 
for annual crop land and 50 years for perennials; (2) land user’s right to 
exchange, transfer, lease, inherit and mortgage land. 
  7•  The declaration of the Water Law in 1999, which established a water allocation 
system using licenses and permits administered by Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MARD) and the provincial governments. In 2002, the 
central management of water resource was assigned to the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment, while the National Water Resources Council 
together with basin-level committees was set-up to manage and allocate water in 
the Red River Delta (RRD), Mekong River Delta (MRD) and Dong Nai basins. 
All these water legislations facilitated the intensification of crops from 1 to 2 or 3 
crops per year. 
In addition, a gradual improvement of market infrastructure and Vietnam’s 
participation in international organizations has generally improved the trading 
environment. 
2.3  Paddy Production and Consumption 
Vietnam’s paddy production has been rising continuously during 1995-2005 with 
an average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent (Figure 3 and Table 3). In addition to 
the incentives from the rice market liberalization, this growth is attributed to an 
increase of 2.9 percent in yield of paddy (productivity) and a weak expansion of 
planted areas devoted to paddy, at the rate of about 0.8 percent per annum. 
Vietnam has two main granaries: the MRD in the South and the RRD in the North. 
These two deltas, which account for 42.5 percent of the population, supply rice to the 
remaining five regions (the North Uplands, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, 
Central Highlands, and Southeast). The MRD, the so-called “rice bowl of Vietnam”, 
supply more than a half (52 percent) of national paddy output, followed by the RRD 
that produces around 20 percent of the total. None of the other five regions accounts 
for more than 9 percent of national paddy production (Table 3). 




















Vietnam Red River Delta Mekong River Delta
S
Source: GSO (2006). 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary 
In the RRD, the average annual growth rate of paddy production was 2 percent 
from 1995 to 2005. That is 2.1 percentage points lower than the growth rate for 
paddy in the MRD. However, the MRD faces higher variability in production than 
the RRD (Figure 3). Among the provinces in the RRD, Thai Binh and Nam Dinh 
rank first and second in paddy production, each accounting for around 3 percent 
of national output and 15 or 16 percent of RRD’s production (Figure 4). They are 
followed by Ha Tay and Hai Duong with about 14 and 13 percent of RRD’s 
paddy production, respectively. The other seven provinces in the RRD produce 
less than 8 percent of national paddy production. 
 
 
  9Table 3: Paddy production by region, 1995-2005 
Year  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
As proportion of total paddy production (%) 
Vietnam  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
Red River Delta  20.4  20.3 20.7 20.7 20.3 20.2 20.0 19.6 18.8 18.6 17.3 19.7
North East  5.8  6.1 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.3 7.0 6.9 7.2 6.9 7.1 6.5
North West  1.3  1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3
North Central Coast  8.6  7.8 9.1 8.0 8.4 8.7 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 8.8 8.8
South Central Coast  5.7  6.0 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.4
Central Highlands  1.7  1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.8
South East  5.1  4.3 4.3 4.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.8
Mekong River 
Delta  51.4  52.8 50.8 53.0 51.9 51.3 49.8 51.4 50.7 51.4 53.7 51.7
Growth rate of paddy production (%) 
Vietnam    4.9 4.2 6.0 8.6 3.6 -1.3 7.3 0.4 4.6  -1.0 3.7
Red River Delta    4.6 5.9 6.1 6.8 3.2 -2.5 5.2 -3.9 3.4  -7.6 2.0
North East    8.9 7.8 3.2 8.2 8.0 9.0 5.5 4.2 0.6 1.9 5.7
North West    -4.0  9.4 -3.8 12.0 8.4 9.2 3.8 6.7 12.4 -0.5 5.2
North Central Coast    -4.9 22.6 -7.2 13.7 7.2 5.1 6.4 2.1  4.9 -6.3 4.0
South Central Coast    10.7  0.8 -1.0 8.9 -1.3 1.5 0.2 9.8  0.7 -6.1 2.3
Central Highlands   -0.5  13.6 
-
10.1 17.4 14.5 10.1 -6.1 23.3 4.5  -8.6 5.2
South East    -12.2 6.0 1.9 31.2 6.2 0.1 -0.1 3.8 2.3  -9.2 2.5
Mekong River 
Delta      7.7 0.2  10.6 6.4 2.5 -4.2 10.7 -1.0 5.9 3.6 4.1
Notes: Figures for 2005 are preliminary. 
Source: Computed from GSO (2006). 















Vietnam Red River Delta Mekong River Delta
 
Source: GSO (2006) 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary Figure 4: Paddy production in Red River and Mekong River Deltas, 1995-2005 









































Source: Computed from GSO (2006). 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary 
The leading paddy growing provinces in the MRD include An Giang, Dong Thap, Kien Giang 
and Can Tho whose shares of national output are each 6 to 7 percent (accounting for 11 to 14 
percent of the MRD’s annual paddy production). They are followed by Long An, Soc Trang and 
Tien Giang, which together account for almost 5 percent of national production. This is equivalent 
to more than 9 percent of the MRD’s annual production (Figure 4). 
Besides the domestic demand, Vietnam also supplies rice to the international market. About 
83 percent of total annual paddy production is consumed domestically while the other 17 
percent is exported. As can be seen from Table 4, the main portion of domestic consumption 
(about 84 percent) is used for food, with the remaining 16 percent accounted for by waste, 
seed and feed. Since the mid 1990s, Vietnam has become a major rice exporting country, with 
the volume of rice exports rising from 2.5 million tons in 1993 to 5.8 million tons in 2003 
(Figure 5). In terms of rice export volumes, Vietnam is now the second largest rice exporter in 
the world after Thailand (Figure 6). However, in terms of value, Vietnam’s rice exports rank 
fourth or fifth in the world market due to the low quality of its rice exports and the limited 
value-added to paddy (Figure 6). 




























Source: FAOSTAT Data, 2006 
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1993-
1995  1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003 Average 
Paddy (thousand tons)  69127.8 82557.4 89073.8 60064.9    
Production   71328.6 83066.1 96031.7 69016.0   
Imports   17.3 2.0 11.8 64.0   
Stock Change  -2218.1 -510.7 -6969.7 -9015.2   
Provided for:        
Exports 8372.1 15484.1 17749.6 10687.8   
Domestic Supply   60755.7 67073.3 71324.3 49377.1   
In which:        
Feed 1132.6 1270.9 1366.8 1168.2   
Seed   2139.9 2492.0 2881.0 2070.5   
Waste 4865.0 5670.0 6549.6 4714.4   
Food Manufacture  335.9 459.0 608.6 150.7   
Food   51957.9 56802.2 59481.2 40957.4   
Other Uses  324.6 379.2 437.0 315.9   
Paddy (%)  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Production   103.2 100.6 107.8 114.9  106.6 
Imports   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Stock Change  -3.2 -0.6 -7.8 -15.0  -6.7 
Provided for:        
Exports 12.1 18.8 19.9 17.8  17.2 
Domestic Supply   87.9 81.2 80.1 82.2  82.9 
In which:        
Feed 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.4  2.0 
Seed   3.5 3.7 4.0 4.2  3.9 
Waste 8.0 8.5 9.2 9.6  8.8 
Food Manufacture  0.6 0.7 0.9 0.3  0.6 
Food   85.5 84.7 83.4 83.0  84.1 
Other Uses  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6 
Notes: Data for 2004 and 2005 are not available. 
Source: Computed from FAOSTAT Data, 2006. 
























Source: FAOSTAT data, 2006 
  122.4  Paddy Marketing 
Before sale to consumers as milled rice, paddy goes through a process that involves many 
stages, including checking and sorting, drying and storing, milling, polishing and 
packaging, storage and transportation (Luu, 2003). There are various channels used for 
marketing paddy and rice in Vietnam (Figure 7). According to Minot and Goletti (1999), 
more than two thirds of paddy is sold to the assemblers, of whom 95 percent are private 
firms. Most of the remainder goes to small-scale millers for farmers’ home consumption, 
while a small share is bought directly by larger millers. The assemblers then either have 
the paddy custom milled or sell paddy to medium and large-scale millers. The assemblers 
and millers then sell the milled rice on to the wholesalers and retailers. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) play a relatively minor role in the within province marketing of paddy 
and rice but control the long-distance trade in rice ad export market. SOEs consist of 
provincial and regional food companies (of which Vinafood I in the North, and Vinafood 
II in the South are the most important). Until recently only the SOEs were permitted to 
export rice to other countries, and they still dominate the export trade. 













Flow of paddy 
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  133  Modelling and Testing for Market Integration with Transfer Costs 
Tests of spatial market integration using time series data on food price dates back to the 
1960s. The first tests arose from Lele’s (1967) and Jones’ (1968) analyses of staple food 
prices in India and Nigeria, respectively. The two authors estimated the contemporaneous 
correlations between price series in two markets in different locations. When the correlations 
were greater than 0.7 or 0.8, they concluded that price movements were close enough for the 
two markets to be considered as being spatially integrated. The cut-off point used for deciding 
if markets were spatially integrated was, however, arbitrary and no consideration was given to 
whether or not the price series were stationary or non-stationary. Nonetheless, many of the 
subsequent (more rigorous) econometric models used for testing spatial market integration 
rely on the same idea of testing how closely prices move together. In particular, models of the 
Law of One Price (Isard, 1977; Richardson, 1978) and the Ravallion model (Ravallion, 1986) 
are both extensions of the correlation idea. Cointegration tests have also been used to test for 
the co-movement of food prices and long-run market integration (Alexander and Wyeth, 
1991; Dawson and Dey, 2002). 
A growing body of the spatial market integration literature stresses the importance of transfer 
costs. Basically, transfer costs introduce a wedge between prices at separate locations, resulting in 
a non-linear relationship between such pairs of prices. The parity bounds model developed by 
Sexton, Kling and Carman (1991) and Baulch (1997) explicitly take account of the non-linear 
price relationship in spatially distributed markets that is caused by transfer costs. Furthermore, 
much recent research focuses on an explicit modeling of threshold effects when testing the Law of 
One Price. See, for example, Goodwin and Piggott (2001), Meyer (2004), and Sarno, Taylor and 
Chowdhury (2004). 
Figure 8: Prices in two markets with transfer costs 
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  14Transfer costs are important both for modeling spatial market integration as they imply a 
potential bias in estimators based on linear models. Consider, for example, a relationship 
between two paddy markets, 2 and 1.  In the absence of transfer costs, spatial market 
integration will imply that the paddy prices in the two markets should be equal, so p1 = p2. In 
Figure 8 such a market integration situation is illustrated by the 45-degree line. Now, if there 
are transfer costs of tc per kilogram of paddy, there need not be any trade between the markets 
when p2 – tc < p1 < p2 + tc because the transfer costs make inter-market trade unprofitable. 
This “no-trade” region suggests that prices respond differently in the three regimes defined by 
the upper and lower thresholds, p2 + tc, p2 – tc. If p1 is above p2 + tc (for example, point A in 
Figure 8) one would expect a trade flow from market 2 to market 1, leading to a price increase 
in market 2 and a price decrease in market 1. Likewise, if p1 is less that p2 - tc (for example, 
point B in Figure 8) trade between the markets should lead to a price decrease in market 2 and 
a price increase in market 1. These effects are not changed by the presence of transfer costs. 
However, prices will only adjust when trade is profitable. When p1 is between the p2 – tc and 
p2 + tc lines in Figure 8 (for example, point C), then there is no trade inducing market forces 
to equate the paddy prices in the two markets. We describe this as the no-trade regime. It 
follows that the overall correlation between the prices may be low if prices are often in this 
no-trade regime. Hence, if we use a linear model when there are positive transfer costs, we are 
likely to underestimate the price correlations in the regimes in which trade is profitable 
because these correlations are confounded by the possible lack of correlation in the no-trade 
regime. 
The main problem with threshold models of spatial market integration is that in the absence of 
information on transfer cost the estimation procedure is rather complicated, particularly with 
two thresholds.
2 To overcome this problem, in this chapter we use outside information on 
transfer costs to formulate a threshold variation of Ravallion’s well-known dynamic model of 
spatial market integration (Ravallion, 1986). Specifically, we use fixed and known threshold 
values computed from additional information (collected from traders and transporters) about 
transfer costs to model the three regimes described above. The remainder of this section 
shows how this model is formulated and presents the testing sequence we use to analyze the 
various forms of spatial market integration. 
Consider Ravallion’s model of market integration in which price in market 1 (p1t) is 
conditional on the price in market 2 (p2t), lagged prices (p1t-i and p2t-i) and a set of seasonal 
dummies (St):
3   
  11 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 ' tt t t t t t pd a p a p b pb p b p S t φ ε −− −− =+ + + + + + + (1) 
 
We generalize this model by allowing the constant, the autoregressive parameters and the 
distributed lag parameters to vary across regimes in the following way: 
 
() () () () () ()
11 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 '
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tt t t t t p d ap ap bp bp bp S t t φ ε −− −− =+ + + + + + +  (2) 
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() () () () () () ()
120 12 (, ,,,,)
s s sssss da a b b b θ = are regime dependent parameters defined by 
   (3) 
(1)
12 1
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2 See Hansen (1996, 1997) for a general estimation procedure of threshold models and Hansen and Seo 
(2002) for estimation of error correction models with threshold effects. 
3 An autoregressive, distributed lag model with two lags appears to give a good description of the 
paddy price series in the subsequent analysis. Therefore, we present the model with two lags rather than 
a more general model having, say, k lags. 
  15where the relationship between the inter-market price spread at lag l and the transfer costs 
(tc1, tc2) determines the regime. For simplicity, we assume that the additive seasonal 
component in the price series is the same in all three regimes, and we also assume the 
innovations are iid(0,￿
2) across the regimes. 
The model in (2) can be reformulated as an error correction model allowing for non-stationary 
and cointegrated prices in the two markets 
 
() () () () () ()
1 2 1 11 2 21 11 21 ()
ss s s s s
tt t t tt t ppp p pp S ' t γ δδαβ μ φ −−− − Δ= Δ+ Δ + Δ + − − + + ε  (4) 
and the parameters in (2) and (4) are related by: 
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The threshold error correction in equation (4) can be used to test most of the interesting 
hypotheses about spatial market integration including the Law of One Price and Ravallion’s 
tests for market segmentation and long-run market integration. To ensure valid inference, our 
first step is to test for stationarity of the individual price series and of the generalized inter-
market price spread.
4 Conditional on the existence of cointegration, we then test the 
hypotheses of interest for spatial market integration using the threshold error correction 
model. 
The first hypothesis to be tested is one of market segmentation. Based on Ravallion (1986), 
we define market segmentation as a model in which the price in market 2 does not Granger-
cause the price in market 1 and, in addition, that there is no instantaneous correlation between 
the price series—in any regime. Hence, in terms of parameter restrictions we say that the 
markets are segmented if in equation (4):  
   (6) 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
02 : 0, 0, 0, for all  0,1,2.
sss H αδγ === = s
.
If market segmentation is rejected, we next test for the number of thresholds. This is done in 
three steps. Specifically, we formulate and test the three hypotheses 
 
(2 ) (1) (0) (2 ) (2) (0) (2 ) (1) (2) (0)
000 :, :, :
abc HHH θ θθ θθ θ === θ =
t
 (7) 
If the first two hypotheses are rejected we infer that there are two thresholds. In contrast, if all 
three hypotheses are accepted we infer that the model is linear. 
Once the number of thresholds is established, we can further reformulate the error correction 
model to allow for freely varying long-run parameters in each regime 
 
() () () () () ()
1 2 1 11 2 21 11 21 '
ss s sss
tt t ttt t ppp ppp d S γ δδα π φ −− − − Δ= Δ+ Δ + Δ + + + + + ε
                                                
 (8) 
Subsequently, we test for long-run market integration, which is the hypothesis 
   (9) 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 : (equivalent to  1)
ss s H απ β =− =
 
4 We test for stationarity of the price series and the price spread in the simplest possible way using the 
ERS unit-root test (Elliot, Rothemberg and Stock, 1996). As we do not include thresholds when testing 
stationarity of the generalized inter-market price spread, we are effectively assuming the long run 
parameters are constant across regimes when testing for stationarity. While the assumption of regime 
independent long run parameters is a restriction on the model, we consider this to be a quite plausible 
initial restriction and later allow for differences in the long-run parameters. 
  16in equation (8). This is equivalent to testing β
(s) = 1 in equation (4). Clearly, the number of 
hypotheses tested depends on the number of thresholds, so our tests for long-run market 
integration are regime dependent. Note that with two thresholds, the information about the 
long run parameters may be weak in particular in the inner (no-trade) regime.
5  
If long run integration is accepted in a regime, we impose the restriction by using the lagged 
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tt pp α −− − ) (8). If long-run market integration is not accepted it makes 
little sense to carry on testing stronger versions of the Law of One Price. Hence, the following 
hypotheses and tests are only reported if the hypothesis of long-run market integration is 
accepted in at least one regime. 
Before testing for the strong version of the Law of One Price we look at a weaker restriction, 
which is akin to the weak market efficiency hypothesis in the financial markets literature. This 
is done by formulating a hypothesis of common dynamics. We define common dynamics to be 
the restriction 
 
(4) ( ) ( )
01 2 :
s s H δ δ =  (10) 
If the hypothesis is accepted, the only past information needed to predict the price in market 1 
is the inter-market price spread in previous periods. Adding information on past values of 
individual prices will not improve the prediction of the price in market 1. 
Finally, given acceptance of long-run market integration and common dynamics it is 
interesting to test for the strong version of the Law of One Price. The hypothesis is formulated 
as 
 
(5) ( ) (s) ( )
01 : 1, and  2
s s H γ δδ ==  (11) 
This involves testing jointly that the prices in the two markets have common dynamics and 
that the conditional correlation between the two prices is one. In this case, a unit change in 
prices in market 2 will be associated with a one unit change in prices in market 1 within the 
current time period. This is similar to Ravallion’s (1986) test for short-run market integration 
(strong form) and implies that the Law of One Price holds contemporaneously.
6
The test for Law of One Price is the final test in the sequence. If this test is not rejected in the 
regimes with trade options, we consider the markets to be fully integrated even if the 
hypothesis is rejected in the no-trade regime.  
                                                  
t
5 It should also be noted that the term ‘long-run market integration’ may be somewhat misleading in this 
model as acceptance of the hypothesis in some regimes does not imply that prices will eventually be 
equal in the absence of shocks. However, if the hypothesis is accepted in all regimes, then the standard 
notion of long-run market integration applies. 
6 If the Law of One Price is not rejected in a regime, the model for that regime reduces to 
 
() () ()
1 21 1 12 1 1 12 1 () ( ) '
ss s
tt tt tt t pp pp pp S δ αμ φ −− −− Δ= Δ+ Δ − + − − + + ε  
and this implies that the loading parameter 
() s α is no longer of “special interest” for describing the 
dynamics of price adjustment. The differences between prices in markets 1 and 2 will, in this regime, be 
a white noise process, given by t ε . 
  174  Data on Paddy Prices, Transfer Costs and Time Series Properties 
4.1  Data 
The paddy price data used in this chapter were provided by Information Center for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (ICARD) and can be publicly accessed online.
7 Prices of paddy (and 
some other agricultural commodities) are collected on Fridays at public markets in sixteen 
provinces. Based on the weekly data, monthly price series are computed by taking averages. It is 
worth considering the appropriateness of using monthly series in testing spatial market 
integration. Luu (2003) argues that average monthly data is inappropriate when analyzing rice 
market integration in the Mekong River Delta because these prices do not reflect the daily prices 
on which traders make their arbitrage decisions. However, in the weekly price series we have 
looked at there are several long periods in which prices do not change at all in almost every 
market. Such constancy of prices will invalidate a statistical analysis that is based on an 
assumption of independent and identically distributed innovations that follow a continuous 
distribution. Moreover, the use of weekly data is problematic due to the need to interpolate 
numerous missing values. For these reasons we have chosen to analyze the monthly data instead 
of the weekly data. However, since one month appears too long a time lag for traders to make 
their arbitrage decisions we construct the regime dummies using a lag of half a month.
8
For paddy prices, monthly data are fully available across eight markets from January, 1993 to 
May, 2006. Given the fact that inflation has changed substantially over the period, we adjust 
for its effects by deflating nominal paddy prices using the Consumer Price Index. 
Accordingly, all paddy prices to be used in the analysis were converted into constant January 
1993 prices. Four out of the eight markets are located in the Red River Delta (Ha Noi, Bac 
Ninh, Nam Dinh, and Thai Binh). The other four markets are located in the Mekong River 
Delta (Can Tho, An Giang, Tien Giang, and Ca Mau). As can be seen in Figure 9, all these 
provinces cluster round the 1A National Road, which is the main road connecting the North, 
Center and South of Vietnam. National roads also connect Ha Noi with Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh 
and Thai Binh and Can Tho with An Giang and Tien Giang. In both the Red River and 
Mekong River deltas, rivers are also used for the transportation of paddy: one of the Mekong 
River’s branches, the Hau Giang, connects An Giang with Can Tho. 
                                                  
)
7 ICARD is an institution under the Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). See the 
website: http://www.agroviet.gov.vn. 
8 We do this by taking an average of the inter-market price spreads at time t and t-1. i.e., 
 where λ = 0.5.  Setting λ equal to 0.25 or 0.75 produces similar results. 
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Source: Drawn by the authors using ArcGIS  
In addition to price series, we also need estimates of transfer costs to determine the thresholds 
used in the estimation of the threshold error correction model defined by equations (4)and (8). 
Transfer costs represent the total observed costs of moving paddy from one market to another, 
and include both fixed costs and variable costs elements. Data on these fixed and variable 
costs were collected through interviews with traders and lorry drivers. The fixed cost element 
comprises loading and unloading costs plus specific trade taxes (where applicable). The 
variable cost element comprises pure freight costs, which vary with the distance traveled and 
road conditions, and ad valorem trade taxes. From our interviews with traders, we have 
estimated the unit cost of transporting one kilogram of paddy over one kilometer. We assume 
that these unit costs are constant in real terms and do not vary according to the distance 
between markets.
9 So to estimate the transportation costs between two markets, we simply 
multiply the unit costs of transportation by the distance between markets. Finally, since it is 
rice rather than paddy which is usually transported between provincial markets, we also have 
to adjust transfer costs by the milling ratio between paddy and rice. Accordingly, our 









=  (12) 
                                                  
9 In theory, unit transportation costs should decline with distance traveled. However, our discussions with 
traders and transporters indicate that this is a very imprecise relationship with freight rates often 
remaining constant between nearby markets. 
  19where 20 (Dong) is the fixed cost of loading and unloading one kilogram of rice, 0.45 (Dong) 
is the unit cost of transporting 1 kilogram of paddy for 1 kilometer, Dij  is the distance 
following the main road between market i and market j and 0.65 is the milling (rice-paddy 
conversion) ratio. 
Table 5 presents our estimated transfer costs between the market pairs in our analysis. Within 
each region (North or South) we assume that transfer costs from market i to market j is the 
same as from market j to market i. However, our discussions with traders suggest that this 
assumption does not hold between markets in the North and South of Vietnam, since the 
demand for moving goods from the South to the North is substantially higher than in the 
opposite direction. Our discussions with traders indicate that premium on moving produce 
from the South to the North is approximately 25 percent, so this is added to our estimates of 
transfer costs between Can Tho and Ha Noi. To be consistent with the paddy price series, we 
have then deflated our transfer cost estimates to constant January 1993 terms using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
Table 5: Estimated Transfer Costs Between Market Pairs 
Market 1  Market 2  Distance (km)  Estimated Transfer Cost 
Ha Noi  Bac Ninh  25  23 
Ha Noi  Nam Dinh  85  43 
Ha Noi  Thai Binh  95  46 
Ha Noi  Can Tho  1794  606 
Can Tho  Ha Noi  1794  758 
Can Tho  An Giang  65  36 
Can Tho  Tien Giang  115  53 
Can Tho  Ca Mau  213  85 
Notes: The transfer costs are measured in Dong per kg in January 1993 prices. 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Stationarity and Cointegration 
Table 6 shows means, medians, and other basic statistics of the monthly price series. We note 
that, on average, prices in the northern provinces are lower than those in the southern 
provinces. Among the eight markets in our sample, An Giang and Can Tho have the lowest 
paddy prices. This low level of prices may well reflect that An Giang and Can Tho are the 
largest paddy producers in Vietnam. Another interesting result in Table 6 is that, on average, 
paddy prices in Ha Noi were lower than in Bac Ninh. To this end it should be noted that the 
median price in Bac Ninh is lower than the median price in Ha Noi. Figures 10 and 11 show 
the monthly paddy prices in the four provinces in the North and the four provinces in the 
South, respectively. Based on the plots, the overall impression is that there is a fairly high co-
movement in prices in the two regions. Furthermore, there is no clear trend in the series; on 
the other hand there is also no clear mean reversion tendency. 
  20Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Paddy Prices 
Market Mean  Median  Std.  dev.  Min Max 
North 
Ha Noi  1348.89  1363.12 219.95 836.11  1934.56
Bac Ninh  1375.96  1350.53 232.18 1021.99  2063.53
Nam Dinh  1308.69  1302.00 222.92 935.51  1930.30
Thai Binh  1286.03  1267.31 212.27 919.78  1862.91
South 
Can Tho  1090.79  1093.13 137.32 765.33  1412.56
An Giang  1083.93  1083.61 155.86 716.89  1487.86
Tien Giang  1112.76  1112.13 149.78 755.10  1560.78
Ca Mau  1101.36  1106.82 166.43 729.56  1668.21
Notes: There are 161 observations in the sample (1993m1-2006m5). Prices are 
measured in terms of Dong per kg in January 1993 prices. 























1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1
Ha Noi Bac Ninh
Nam Dinh Thai Binh
Source: Drawn by the authors using price data from
the Information Center for Agriculture and Rural Development
 























1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1
An Giang Ca Mau
Can Tho Tien Giang
Source: Drawn by the authors using price data from
the Information Center for Agriculture and Rural Development
 
  21We next examine the time series properties of the prices by testing for stationarity using 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock’s (1996) modified Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots.
10 The ERS 












where ￿t is a deterministic component,   is a stationary process with zero mean, and ￿ is the 
autoregressive parameter. The null hypothesis that ￿ = 1 implies that the series   has a unit 
root (i.e., is integrated of order one, I(1)) and it is tested against the alternative |￿| < 1, 




The ERS procedure works as follows. First, a local unit root is assumed by fixing the 
parameter (1 / ) cT ρ =+ .
11 The parameter is used to form quasi-differences of the series: 
12 13 2 1 {, , , , } TT yy yy y y y ρ ρρ − −− − K  and the quasi-differences are regressed on 
corresponding quasi-differences of the deterministic components (constant, trend, and so on). 
Subsequently, a standard ADF-test is used to test if the non-deterministic component of the 
series (￿t) has a unit root. 
Table 7 reports the results of testing for unit roots in each price series using the ERS test with 
a trend as the dominating deterministic component. The number of lags is chosen using the 
Schwarz information criterion. All price series in the northern markets have unit roots in 
levels but not in first differences, hence they are I(1). However, in the southern markets the 
price series from An Giang, and Tien Giang do not seem to have unit roots when tested at the 
5 percent level of significance though they do have unit roots at the 1% level of significance. 
The test statistic for Ca Mau lies on the boundary of accepting or rejecting the unit root at the 
5 percent level. Like the North, null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for the first 
differences of the prices in the South. In sum, we conclude that, all the price series are 
integrated of order 1. 
Table 7: Unit-Root Tests 
First differences  Levels 
Market  Optimal lag  Test statistic  Optimal lag  Test statistic 
North         
 Ha  Noi  1  -10.31  2  -2.21 
 Bac  Ninh  1  -8.42  1  -2.34 
 Nam  Dinh  1  -8.91  1  -2.35 
 Thai  Binh  1  -8.97  1  -2.34 
South      
 Can  Tho  4  -3.06  2  -2.48 
 An  Giang  1  -10.13  1  -3.22 
  Tien Giang  1  -9.75  1  -2.96 
 Ca  Mau  3  -3.32  1  -3.52 
Notes: The test for unit-roots is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) test with 
seasonal dummies included. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for levels are -
3.51, -2.91, and -2.63, respectively. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for first 
differences are -2.59, -2.04, and -1.72, respectively. 
                                                  
10 This test is also known as the DFGLS test. Basically, this test follows the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
procedure, but, as stated in Baum and Sperling (2001), it has better power than the ADF-test in small 
samples. 
11 In most cases, ￿t is zero, a constant or a linear trend.  c is set to -13.5 if the model contains a linear 
trend, and -7 if it does not. 
  22Next we test for stationarity of residuals from pair-wise Engle-Granger-type cointegrating 
regressions and stationarity of the inter-market price spreads (Table 8). We expect to reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals for the assumptions underlying our general 
threshold error correction model to hold. In general, we can strongly reject the hypothesis of a 
unit root and conclude that there is cointegration between all market pairs. However, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the residuals of regressing Can Tho on 
Tien Giang. For the inter-market price spreads, which are used for the error correction terms 
in the restricted version of our model, we can also reject a unit root for all market pairs at the 
5 percent level. 
Table 8: Pair-wise Cointegration Tests 
Residuals from  
Cointegration regressions  Inter-market price spread 
Market pair  Optimal lag  Test statistics Optimal lag  Test statistics
 Ha Noi –Can Tho  1  -3.37     1  3.41 
North      
 Ha Noi –Bac Ninh  2   -3.69  2  -3.84 
 Ha Noi – Nam Dinh  1  -5.26  1  -5.33 
 Ha Noi – Thai Binh  1   -4.19  1  -4.45 
South     . 
 Can Tho - An Giang  2  -5.78  2  -5.65 
  Can Tho - Tien Giang  3  -2.42  3  -2.38 
 Can Tho – Ca Mau  1  -4.97  1  -5.56 
Notes: The test for unit root is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) test with 
seasonal dummies included. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for the 
residuals from the cointegration regressions are -3.43, -2.86, and
 -2.57, respectively. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for the inter-market 
price spread are -2.59, -2.04, and -1.72, respectively. 
5  Tests for Market Integration 
In this Section, we apply the sequential approach to testing for market integration discussed in 
Section 3 to the eight non-stationary and cointegrated paddy price series described above in 
order to investigate: (i) whether paddy markets in the North and the South of Vietnam are 
spatially integrated, (ii) if paddy markets within the North and within the South are integrated, 
and (iii) if price adjustment within regions are stronger (and faster) than between them. 
To investigate whether paddy markets in the North and the South of Vietnam are spatially 
integrated, we choose Ha Noi to represent the North of Vietnam and Can Tho to represent the 
South. Ha Noi, the capital city of Vietnam, is the second largest city in Vietnam and it is 
located close to the centre of the Red River Delta. Can Tho is the major milling and exporting 
centre in the Mekong River Delta.
12 Having tested if Ha Noi and Can Tho are spatially 
integrated, we then move on to examining whether the other three markets in the North (Bac 
Ninh, Nam Dinh and Thai Binh) are spatially integrated with Ha Noi. Then we perform 
similar tests with Can Tho and the other three markets in the South (An Giang, Tien Giang 
and Cau Mau). Recall that only when market segmentation is rejected and long-run market 
integration is accepted, do we move on to testing for common dynamics and the Law of One 
Price.  
                                                  
12 Ho Chi Minh City, the major commercial centre and largest city in Vietnam, would have been an 
alternative choice for the major centre of demand in the South.  However, it is not located in the 
Mekong River Delta and the paddy price data available for Ho Chi Minh City are very incomplete. 
  23Table 9 summarizes the test results for all market pairs. Two thresholds are indicated for all 
market pairs except for Ha Noi and Can Tho (where no thresholds are detected) and between 
Ha Noi and Bac Ninh (where there is no statistical difference between the parameters in the 
above and inside regimes). Market segmentation is also strongly rejected for all market pairs, 
except for Can Tho and Cau Mau, implying that paddy prices in the demand centers are 
influenced by paddy prices in the markets in the producing areas 















Ha Noi - Can Tho  0     A  R  R  0.410  -0.149
   [1.00]  [0.287]  [0.009]  [0.000]  (0.105)  (0.040)
North              
Ha Noi - Bac Ninh  1  Above + 
Inside  A A  R  0.644  -1.181
   [0.50]  [0.592]  [0.095]  [0.000]  (0.073)  (0.356)
   Below  A  A  R  0.637  -0.606
   [0.50]  [0.071]  [0.632]  [0.000]  (0.082)  (0.096)
Ha Noi - Nam Dinh  2  Above   A  A  R  0.600  -0.437
   [0.42]  [0.853]  [0.446]  [0.000]  (0.084)  (0.105)
    Inside    A  A  A  1   
   [0.37]  [0.208]  [0.990]  [0.741]  (--)   
   Below  A  A  A  1   
   [0.21]  [0.620]  [0.065]  [0.129]  (--)   
Ha Noi - Thai Binh  2  Above  A  A  R  0.495  -0.407
   [0.54]  [0.941]  [0.964]  [0.000]  (0.073)  (0.088)
    Inside    A  A  R  0.779  -1.394
   [0.32]  [0.438]  [0.871]  [0.012]  (0.074)  (0.151)
   Below  A  A  A  1   
   [0.14]  [0.629]  [0.512]  [0.203]  (--)   
South 
Can Tho - An Giang  2  Above  A  A  R  0.733  -1.083
   [0.27]  [0.838]  [0.419]  [0.001]  (0.073)  (0.175)
   Inside  A  A  R  0.859  -1.357
   [0.57]  [0.125]  [0.870]  [0.049]  (0.057)  (0.117)
   Below  A  R  R  0.868  -1.201
   [0.16]  [0.156]  [0.039]  [0.039]  (0.010)  (0.158)
Can Tho - Tien Giang  2  Above  A  A  A  1   
   [0.08]  [0.807]  [0.432]  [0.669]  (--)   
   Inside  A  A  R  0.798  -0.587
   [0.62]  [0.067]  [0.064]  [0.000]  (0.062)  (0.095)
   Below  A  A  R  0.808  -0.947
   [0.30]  [0.243]  [0.779]  [0.010]  (0.066)  (0.172)
Can Tho - Ca Mau  2  Above  A  A  R  0.452  -0.864
   [0.06]  [0.947]  [0.161]  [0.003]  (0.200)  (0.306)
    Inside R        
   [0.77]  [0.012]         
   Below  R         
       [0.17]  [0.009]            
Notes: R and A indicate the null-hypotheses can be rejected and ‘accepted’ at the 5% 
level of significance.
p-values and regime frequencies are given in square brackets. Standard errors of the 
estimated parameters ￿ and ￿ are shown in round brackets.  
  24The finding of no thresholds for Ha Noi and Can Tho requires further comment, as these are 
the two most important demand centres in the Red River and Mekong River deltas. The 
absence of a threshold between these markets implies that there is a linear relationship 
between paddy prices in Ha Noi and Can Tho. As can been seen from the time series plot of 
price differences on the right hand side of Figure 12, the inter-market prices spread only 
exceeds estimated transfer costs in 160 of our 161 observations. Under such circumstances 
one would not expect to observe a high correlation between paddy price changes in Ha Noi 
and Can Tho, and this is born out by the disparate cross plot of prices on the left-hand side of 
Figure 12. It is also reflected in the size of the coefficient on contemporaneous price changes 
(γ) in Can Tho in the unrestricted linear error correction model being 0.410. Furthermore, the 
loading coefficient (α) on the lagged inter-market price spread indicates that the speed of price 
adjustment between Ha Noi and Can Tho is rather slow. Put differently, transfer costs 
between Ha Noi and Can Tho (which are 1,790 kms apart) are sufficiently high to make trade 
between the two markets unprofitable virtually all of the time. We can therefore conclude that 
paddy markets in Ha Noi and Can Tho are only weakly integrated which, in turn, suggests 
there is low integration between paddy and rice markets in the North and South of Vietnam.
13
Figure 12: Cross Plot of Ha Noi and Can Tho and Time Series Plot of the Inter-market Price 
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In contrast to Ha Noi and Can Tho, thresholds are indicated for all market pairs within the 
North and within the South of Vietnam. In general, we find two-threshold models, in 
accordance with the theory. However, for Ha Noi and Bac Ninh, the two geographically 
closest markets in our series we find no statistical significant difference between the 
parameters in the regime above the threshold (when the price in Ha Noi is greater than the 
price in Bac Ninh plus transfer costs) and the no-trade regime. This may reflect Bac Ninh’s 
role as satellite town to Hanoi, with millers and wholesalers shipping to either Hanoi or Bac 
Ninh but little paddy or rice being traded between the two markets. Hence for this market pair 
a one threshold model is estimated, with strong co-movement of prices indicated by the γ 
coefficients (of 0.644 and 0.637) in the two regimes. 
Given the results about the number of thresholds we move on to test the hypothesis of long-
run market integration for each regime in turn. Long-run integration, which corresponds to a 
one-unit change in the price in one market eventually translating into a one-unit price change 
                                                  
13 Recall that the price series used for these tests is for ordinary paddy, so there may still be trade in high 
quality (‘fancy’) rice between the South and North of Vietnam. 
  25in the other market, occurs in all regimes in all markets in the North and in all regimes in two 
of the three markets in the South. The exception is the market pair Can Tho – Ca Mau for 
which long run integration is rejected both in the no-trade regime and in the below regime 
(when the paddy price in Ca Mau exceeds the paddy price in Can Tho plus the transfer costs). 
Long run integration cannot, however be rejected in the upper regime, although the number of 
observations is very small in that regime, making us reluctant to draw strong conclusions for 
that regime. 
Only when long-run market integration is indicated do we test for common dynamics and the 
Law of One Price using the restricted version of the threshold error correction model. 
Generally, for thresholds and market pairs for which long-run integration is indicated, 
common dynamics are also found.
14 This is not surprising because both cointegration and 
long-run integration imply the existence of a long-run relationship between paddy prices in 
the relevant markets. The finding of a common dynamics shows that all necessary information 
for predicting the future price is contained in the inter-market price spread (weak-form market 
efficiency). 
The Law of One Price is, however, firmly rejected for most market pairs.
15 This is again not 
surprising as the form of the Law of One Price which is being tested requires both that price 
changes in the two markets move together on a one-for-one basis within a single period and 
that the common factor restriction also holds. As can be seen from the last but one column of 
Table 9, the γ coefficients between contemporaneous prices changes for these regimes and 
market pairs are all between 0.41 and 0.87, which is indicative of reasonably strong but far 
from perfect co-movement of paddy prices. Furthermore, for most market pairs, the γ 
coefficients exceed 0.6 when the inter-market price spread is above the upper or below the 
lower threshold. From this we may conclude that, when prices between markets are above or 
below their threshold levels, at least 60 percent of price changes are transmitted between 
markets within a month.   
The final column of Table 9 shows the loading coefficients (α) from the restricted error 
correction models. As expected, all the αs are negative showing that the inter-market price 
spreads will converge to their long-run equilibrium values. The absolute sizes of these loading 
coefficients indicate very rapid ‘corrections’ in some markets. In particular in the South we 
find that the inter-market price spreads returns to the no trade region within the following 
month. In addition, the absolute size of the loading coefficient is much smaller for Ha Noi and 
Can Tho than for market pairs within the North and within the South. This suggests that 
prices co-move more strongly when the threshold band is narrow. Put differently, when 
transfer costs do not prevent trade, spatial arbitrage brings price differentials back to their 
thresholds quickly. This is confirmed by the time series plots in Figure 13, which shows fairly 
rapid reversion of the price spreads whenever spreads exceed the transfer costs.  
Taken together, our sequential tests for market integration show weak evidence of market 
integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam, but stronger evidence 
of spatial market integration within the North and within the South of Vietnam. While there is 
evidence of thresholds and long-run integration for most market pairs, the strict version of the 
Law of One Price does not hold in general even when the price difference between markets 
exceeds the upper or lower thresholds. Nonetheless, when price spreads are above or below 
                                                  
14 Here the exception is the lower regime in the Can Tho – An Giang market in which common dynamics 
is rejected with a p-value of 0.04.  
15 When the Law of One Price is not rejected it is often in regimes with a relatively low frequency, such as 
the lower regime in the Ha Noi – Thai Binh market and the upper regime in the Can Tho – Tien Giang 
market. However, we find the Law of One Price to hold in two regimes in the Ha Noi – Nam Dinh market 
suggesting a close integration of this market pair. 
 
  26the relevant thresholds, a large fraction of the price changes are transmitted between paddy 
markets within a very short period of time. The extent and speed of price transmission is 
generally faster in paddy markets located in the South. 
Figure 13: Time Series Plots of the Inter-market Price Spreads with Thresholds given by 
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  276  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
There has been very little research on food market integration in Vietnam. This chapter aims 
to help fill this gap by focusing on the spatial integration of paddy markets in the Red River 
and Mekong River deltas. The empirical model developed uses estimates of transfer costs to 
generalize the well-known Ravallion model to allow for the possibility of threshold effects. A 
sequential testing strategy is then developed which progressively tests for market 
segmentation, the number of thresholds, long-run market integration, common dynamics and 
(the strict version of) the Law of One Price within an error-correction framework. 
To determine whether an error correction framework is appropriate, we first test our eight 
monthly paddy price series for non-stationary and cointegration using the Elliot, Rothenberg 
and Stock version of the Dickey-Fuller test. All paddy price series are found to be non-
stationary and cointegrated indicating that a long-run relationship exists between market pairs 
and that an error-correction formulation of our threshold model is appropriate.  
When the unrestricted version of this model is estimated, we find weak evidence of market 
integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam and an absence of 
threshold effects. However, there is evidence of both threshold effects and stronger forms of 
spatial market integration for paddy markets within the North and within the South. 
Specifically, convergence towards the relevant thresholds and informational efficiency hold 
for most market pairs, with at least 60% percent of price changes being transmitted between 
markets within one month whenever price spreads exceeds their upper or lower thresholds. 
The extent and speed of price transmission within regional paddy markets is generally faster 
in the South than the North of Vietnam. However, the instantaneous version of the Law of 
One Price, which requires full price adjustment occur within a month, only holds for a few 
regimes and market pair. 
The policy implications of these results flow from the answers to our three initial questions. 
First, since there is limited evidence of integration between paddy markets in the North and 
South of Vietnam, national level policies cannot be relied upon to stabilize or support paddy 
prices. Instead, agricultural policies need to be designed and implemented with the specific 
production, consumption and marketing characteristics of northern and southern Vietnam in 
mind. Second, since there is evidence of market integration within the Red River and Mekong 
River deltas, paddy markets within these regions can be relied upon to transmit price signals 
between deficit and surplus areas relatively well. This is good news as it should help 
agricultural producers to specialize according to comparative advantage and promote 
investment and growth in the rural areas. Third, since the speed and extent of price 
transmission is relatively rapid within the North and within the South of Vietnam, the private 
sector trade can be relied upon to transfer rice and paddy between markets in an efficient 
manner. If, however, large demand-supply imbalances were to emerge between the North and 
South, transfer costs are likely to prevent private sector trade taking place and the public 
sector might need to intervene to ensure adequate supplies in the short-term. Such 
interventions would, however, need to be implemented in a consistent and market friendly 
way to avoid destabilizing and distorting an essentially well integrated and competitive paddy 
marketing system. 
Finally further research is needed to examine the robustness of our results to different 
assumptions about threshold costs and investigate where and how paddy and rice price 
formation takes places (including the influence of the rice export market). There is also a need 
to collect better and more frequent data on paddy and rice prices in different locations and 
stages in the marketing chain, so that the vertical dimensions of market integration can be 
examined. 
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